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Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀect of foreign direct investment on the productivity of
local firms. We decompose traditional country-wide spillover measures in diﬀerent
components according to both distance between foreign and domestic firms and time-
since-foreign-entry. We find larger and faster spillover eﬀects for local suppliers of
foreign firms at shorter distance, driven mainly by recent foreign entrants. Irrespective
of distance, foreign firms of medium maturity generate backward spillover eﬀects that
fade away with longer presence. A positive eﬀect on local competitors is not significantly
aﬀected by distance and requires the presence of mature foreign firms.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, countries actively and fiercely compete to attract foreign direct investment
(see Harding and Smarzynska Javorcik (2011)). Policymakers are eager to do so for several
reasons. First of all, they expect to benefit in terms of faster economic growth in their
country through additional foreign capital and higher employment. Second, foreign firms
are expected to bring more advanced technology (see Markusen (1995)) which policymakers
believe to ’spill over’ to domestic firms, with increased domestic productivity as a result.
Spillovers from foreign to domestic firms have been investigated at least since Caves (1974).
Initially, it proved diﬃcult to detect clear evidence of aggregate positive FDI spillovers (see
Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). Following Smarzynska Javorcik
(2004), the literature now distinguishes between spillovers within the same industry (hori-
zontal spillover eﬀects) as well as those resulting from vertical links along the supply chain
(backward and forward spillover eﬀects). The recent literature seems to have established
fairly robust evidence of positive backward spillover eﬀects from foreign firms to their do-
mestic suppliers. By means of a meta-analysis Havránek and Irsˆová (2011) confirm that the
average backward spillover eﬀect is both statistically and economically significant.
Following new theoretical insights that stress the importance of firm level heterogeneity
in the study of firms’ participation in international markets (see Melitz (2003) and Helpman
et al. (2004)), the literature has moved away from the idea that spillovers are uncondi-
tional and uniform. The focus has instead turned to the identification of characteristics
that facilitate positive spillover eﬀects, often concerning domestic firms’ characteristics such
as absorptive capacity (e.g. Merlevede and Schoors (2007)) or foreign firms’ characteristics
2
such as ownership structure (e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) and Kamal
(2014)). In this paper we combine two other potential determinants of spillover eﬀects. We
focus on distance between foreign and domestic firms and combine this with a recent finding
by Merlevede et al. (2014) who relate foreign firms’ spillover potential to the duration of their
presence in the host country, i.e. their maturity. We analyse whether spillovers vary with
distance and whether it takes more time for spillovers to manifest themselves over longer
distances.
Several authors have investigated whether spillovers entail a regional dimension. This has
resulted in mixed findings. For instance Aitken and Harrison (1999) found no evidence of
local horizontal spillover eﬀects, nor of country-wide spillover eﬀects in Venezuela. Mariotti
et al. (2014) find that spillover eﬀects are strong in knowledge intensive sectors, but geo-
graphical proximity is not relevant. Both Keller (2002) and Halpern and Muraközy (2007),
on the other hand, do find that spillover eﬀects decline or disappear with distance. Using data
for Portugal, Crespo et al. (2009) confirm the importance of considering the geographical
proximity between MNCs and domestic firms in relation to the occurrence of FDI spillovers.
Finally, Altomonte and Colantone (2008) and Wen (2013) report mixed results, with only
some regions recording positive spillovers, suggesting that, aside from distance, other regional
characteristics, such as diﬀerences in foreign firms’ entry and maturity patterns, might be
driving responses to FDI inflows.
We contribute to this literature by incorporating an additional element in the analysis of
the impact of distance on FDI spillover eﬀects: time-since-foreign-entry. Recently, Merlevede
et al. (2014) have shown that adequately accounting for time-since-foreign-entry reveals new
insights in the case of country-wide spillovers. They show that positive horizontal spillover
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eﬀects require the presence of mature foreign firms, while positive backward spillover eﬀects
arise rapidly following foreign entry, but are transient.
In this paper we use a panel of Romanian manufacturing firms that allows us to investi-
gate whether spillover eﬀects are limited to the regional level or whether it takes more time
for spillovers to manifest themselves over longer distances, across region borders. We use
variation across 40 Romanian NUTS 3 regions1 to identify regional patterns. We find neg-
ative horizontal spillover eﬀects for medium maturities of foreign firms, but larger positive
spillover eﬀects for foreign firms that have been present for at least four full years in the
domestic economy. Results indicate that, on aggregate, the eﬀect of distance on horizontal
spillover eﬀects is limited. Point estimates do suggest that distance mitigates the negative
eﬀects, while it increases the positive spillover eﬀects from foreign firms with longer pres-
ence. Point estimates cannot, however, be rejected to be equal over diﬀerent distances at
conventional levels. This suggests that mechanisms behind horizontal spillover eﬀects are
largely independent of distance. Backward spillover eﬀects, however, are aﬀected by dis-
tance. Domestic firms located in the same region as a foreign client are found to experience
an immediate bonus eﬀect upon foreign entry. We find that ’relocating’ a firm from its own
region to Bucharest-Ilfov, the capital region and top FDI location, is associated with an 11
per cent larger backward spillover eﬀect on average over the sample period. For medium
maturities of foreign firms, we find a significant positive backward spillover eﬀect which is
not related to distance. In line with Merlevede et al. (2014), backward spillover eﬀects are
absent for foreign firms that have been present for at least four full years in the domestic
1The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical system for dividing
up the economic territory of the EU. A NUTS level 3 region is a "small region for specific diagnoses". The
minimum and maximum population thresholds for a NUTS 3 region are defined as 150,000 and 800,000.
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economy. These results are robust to foreign firm location choice. Considering regional
heterogeneity, we find the same pattern of backward spillover coeﬃcients for above median
productivity regions. For below median productivity regions, on the other hand, we no
longer observe a significant immediate backward eﬀect upon entry of foreign clients in the
region. Furthermore, the within region backward spillover coeﬃcients are no longer signifi-
cant, neither are they significantly diﬀerent from backward spillover coeﬃcients from other
regions. Consistent with the view that it might take time for spillovers to be absorbed over
larger distances, domestic firms in below median productivity regions do experience positive
backward spillover eﬀects from further away, but more mature foreign firms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the cur-
rent spillovers literature and introduce the standard measurement and empirical framework.
Section 3 introduces our regional time-since-foreign-entry approach to spillovers. Section 4
discusses the data and in section 5 we present results. Finally, we conclude in section 6.
2 Literature, standard measurement and empirical frame-
work
The current literature distinguishes between several types of spillovers. Horizontal spillovers
run from a foreign firm to a host country firm in the same industry. Teece (1977) suggests
two main channels for horizontal spillovers: technology imitation (the demonstration eﬀect)
and mobility of workers trained by foreign firms (see also Fosfuri et al. (2001), and Görg and
Strobl (2005)). Marin and Bell (2006) find that training activities by foreign subsidiaries
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are related to stronger horizontal spillovers. Foreign entry may also fuel competition in
the domestic market. Fiercer competition urges host country firms to either use existing
technologies and resources more eﬃciently or adopt new technologies and organizational
practices, which provides another important channel of horizontal spillovers (see Aitken and
Harrison (1999), and Glass and Saggi (2002)). None of these eﬀects is necessarily positive,
however. Labor market dynamics may entail negative spillovers such as a brain drain of local
talent to foreign firms to the detriment of local firm productivity (see Blalock and Gertler
(2008)) or an overall increase in wages irrespective of productivity improvements caused
by foreign firms paying higher wages (see Aitken et al. (1996)). Where foreign technology
is easily copied, the foreign investor may choose to avoid leakage costs on state-of-the-art
technology by transferring technology that is only marginally superior to technology found
in the host country (see Glass and Saggi (1998)). Such policies obviously limit the scope for
horizontal spillovers via demonstration eﬀects. The higher productivity of foreign aﬃliates
may also lead to lower prices or less demand for the products of domestic competitors. If
domestic firms fail to raise productivity in response to the increased competition, they will be
pushed up their average cost curves (see Aitken and Harrison (1999), on this market-stealing
eﬀect). These partial eﬀects are hard to disentangle empirically and a general measure for
horizontal spillover potential is typically used to identify the net eﬀect of all these channels.
Backward spillovers run from the foreign firm to its upstream local suppliers. Thus, even
if foreign firms attempt to minimise their technology leakage to direct competitors (i.e. the
horizontal eﬀect), they may still want to assist their local suppliers in providing inputs of
suﬃcient quality in order to realise the full benefits of their investment. In other words, they
want the inputs from the host country to be lower cost yet similar in quality to inputs in
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the home country. If a foreign firm decides to source locally, it may transfer technology to
more than one domestic supplier and encourage upstream technology diﬀusion to circumvent
a hold-up problem. Rodríguez-Clare (1996) shows that the backward linkage eﬀect is more
likely to be favourable when the good produced by the foreign firm uses intermediate goods
intensively and when the home and host countries are similar in terms of the variety of
intermediate goods produced. Under reversed conditions, the backward linkage eﬀect could
even damage the host country’s economy. Forward spillovers run from a foreign firm to its
local buyers. In their meta-study Havránek and Irsˆová (2011) indicate that the best practice
estimate of forward spillover eﬀects is insignificant. Given these findings and in line with
other recent work such as Damijan et al. (2013), we focus on backward spillovers.2
The empirical framework to analyse spillover eﬀects can be seen as an ’augmented’ pro-
duction function, where spillover variables are added to other explanatory variables such as
labour, capital, and material inputs. The typical measure employed to identify horizontal or
within-industry spillover eﬀects is given by Equation (1). For a (domestic) firm i in industry
j at time t it is of the following form:
HRjt =
P
i2j
FitYitP
i2j
Yit
(1)
where Y is output and F is the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors. In
line with the definition commonly applied by the OECD or the IMF, at least 10% of shares
should be owned by a single foreign investor for a firm to be considered as foreign. HRjt in
(1) measures the share of output that is produced by foreign firms in industry j. Since this
2Furthermore, Damijan et al. (2013) indicate that foreign aﬃliates in Eastern Europe (we consider Romania)
are mainly engaged in end-user consumer goods.
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spillover variable is built up to industry level from firm-level data, HRjt has the same value
for all firms i in industry j at time t. The definition of the backward spillover variable, BKjt,
starts from the horizontal measure and combines it with information from input-output tables
as in:
BKjt =
X
k 6=j
 jkt ⇤HRkt (2)
where  jkt is the proportion of industry j’s output supplied to sourcing industry k at
time t. The  ’s are calculated from (time-varying) IO-tables for intermediate consumption.
Inputs sold within the firm’s industry are excluded (k 6= j) because this is captured by
HRjt. Since firms cannot easily, nor quickly switch industries to buy inputs, this approach
avoids the problem of endogeneity by using the share of industry output sold to downstream
domestic markets k with some level of foreign presence HRkt. Employing the share of firm
output sold to foreign firms in diﬀerent industries would cause endogeneity problems if the
latter prefer to buy inputs from more productive domestic firms. In line with BKjt, we can
define FWjt as
P
l 6=j  jlt ⇤ HRlt where  jlt is the proportion of industry j’s inputs sourced
from industry l at time t. The spillover variables HRjt, BKjt, and FWjt are then regressed
on the productivity of (domestic) firm i in industry j. The size, sign, and significance of the
resulting coeﬃcients are then taken as evidence of spillover eﬀects.
As indicated above, FDI spillovers are commonly analyzed in a production function
framework. Firm level total factor productivity is obtained in a first step estimation and
in a second step the FDI spillover variables together with some further controls are treated
as additional ‘input’ explaining domestic firms’ productivity. The careful estimation of the
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production function is thus an important building block in the analysis. The basic problem
in estimating productivity is that firms react to firm-specific productivity shocks that are
not observed by the researcher.
Griliches and Mairesse (1995) provide a detailed account of this problem and make the
case that inputs should be treated as endogenous variables since they are chosen on the basis
of the firm’s unobservable assessment of its productivity. The semi-parametric approaches by
Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) and a more recent modification of it by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) (LP), and the dynamic panel data approach by Blundell and Bond (1998) (DPD)
are alternative methodologies to overcome the endogeneity bias in estimating production
functions. Both types of methodologies have been widely used in the recent literature on
firm level heterogeneity for derivation of total factor productivity measures. More recently,
Ackerberg et al. (2008) (ACF) argue that, while there are some solid and intuitive identifi-
cation ideas in the papers by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), their
semi-parametric techniques suﬀer from collinearity problems casting doubt on the method-
ology. They suggest an alternative methodology that make use of the ideas in these papers,
but do not suﬀer from these collinearity problems. We therefore use the ACF estimator
to obtain our indicator of total factor productivity (TFP). A measure of TFP for firm i in
industry j at time t is obtained as the diﬀerence between output and capital, labor, and
material inputs, multiplied by their estimated coeﬃcients:
tfpijt = Yijt   b ljlijt   b kjkijt   b mjmijt (3)
Following the literature (e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik (2004)), in the second step tfpijt is
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related to a firm specific eﬀect, a vector of spillover variables, FDIjt, and firm and industry
level controls, Zi(j)t. Note that (4) now pools firms from all industries together in one large
panel, whereas (3) is estimated by industry. This approach is what Havránek and Irsˆová
(2011) define as best practice.
tfpijt = ↵i + 1f (FDIjt 1) + 2Zi(j)t + ⇠ijt (4)
 1 in equation 4 allows us to identify the sign, size, and significance of the impact of
foreign presence on the productivity of local firms. In the next section we define our vectors
of spillover variables, FDIjt, and control variables, Zi(j)t.
3 A regional dynamic approach to spillovers
In this section we introduce our regional dynamic approach to the identification of
spillover eﬀects in the above framework. Whereas we do not have information on the exact
location of foreign firms in our dataset (cf. infra), we do know in which NUTS 3 region
a firm is located. We use the NUTS 3 classification as our regional dimension. At this
level Romania is divided in 42 territorial units, i.e. 41 counties and the capital Bucharest.
Our data, however, do not allow us to discriminate between Bucharest and the surrounding
county Ilfov. Therefore, we have 41 territorial units in our analysis. The NUTS 3 level is
appropriate because we find quite some heterogeneity between regions in terms of foreign
presence and larger regional aggregates (e.g. the NUTS 2 division) would hide this hetero-
geneity. The NUTS 3 division also follows an original administrative structure for which we
are able control by means of region fixed eﬀects.
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Figure 1 plots the share of industry output produced by foreign firms in a region from
the total country-wide output of that industry (the average over manufacturing industries
in a given region is plotted). The figure clearly shows that foreign presence is not uniformly
spread across regions. Over the sample period the dispersion of FDI intensity at the regional
level (measured by the standard deviation) has increased from 1.7 in 2000 to 1.9 in 2005.
Given the potential contribution of spillover eﬀects to economic growth, it is important to test
whether these regional diﬀerences in FDI intensity have an impact on where spillover eﬀects
are generated, whether spillover eﬀects diﬀer in size across regions and whether and how
spillover eﬀects spread from one region to another. We now introduce our methodological
approach. We first introduce the distance dimension, and then interact it with the time-
since-foreign entry dimension.
[Insert Figure 1 near here]
3.1 Spillovers and distance
The typical measure to capture within-industry spillover eﬀects HRjt in (1) is the share
of output that is produced by foreign firms in industry j. For a given firm i in industry j in
region r at time t we can break HRjt down into diﬀerent ’geographical’ subcomponents as
follows:
11
HRjt =
P
i2j
FitYitP
i2j
Yit
(5)
=
P
RitFitYitP
Yit
+
P
NBitFitYitP
Yit
+
P
(1 Rit  NBit)FitYitP
Yit
(6)
where Rit indicates whether firm i is located in region r, and NBit indicates whether
firm i is located in a contiguous region of r. Finally, (1 Rit  NBit) will equal 1 if firm
i is located in a further-away non-neighbouring region, i.e. a rest-of-country category.3 We
refer to this regional decomposition as ’distance’.
From (6) it becomes clear that introducing HRjt as a single variable in a regression
involves the implicit assumption that the spillover intensity -as measured by the coeﬃcient
obtained on HRjt- is the same within and across regions. In our empirical analysis we relax
this assumption and allow the coeﬃcients to diﬀer between the diﬀerent subcomponents in
(6), obtaining estimates for region, neighbour and rest-of-country components respectively.
A regional definition for BK follows from (2) above. Since we only have input-output tables
at the country-level, we assume that technical coeﬃcients are similar across regions and equal
those derived from country-level input output tables.
We diﬀer from earlier literature by explicitly structuring the regional dimension as a
decomposition of the traditional nation-wide definition. By introducing all three subcompo-
nents of (6) in our analysis we also diﬀer from part of the regional FDI spillover literature that
3Clearly, (6) could be further decomposed in a straightforward manner to account for second- or even higher-
order neighbours. However, since adding second-order neighbour eﬀects does not aﬀect our estimates with
respect to region, neighbour, and rest-of-country, we focus on the three aforementioned dimensions. These
results are available on request.
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does not allow for cross-regional spillovers. Often only the first term of the decomposition
is included among the regressors, thereby implicitly assuming that spillovers are confined to
region boundaries and do not cross borders. This runs counter to Halpern and Muraközy
(2007) who find that horizontal spillovers vary with distance, but do not disappear. It also
runs counter to macro-spillover studies as Keller (2002) who finds that spillovers between
countries are declining with distance. We further distinguish ourselves from the existing
literature by modeling cross-region spillover eﬀects. Consider the following reformulation of
(6), where summation is over firms i in industry j:
HRjt =
P
RitFitYitP
RitYit
⇥
P
RitYitP
Yit
+
P
NBitFitYitP
NBitYit
⇥
P
NBitYitP
Yit
+
P
(1 Rit  NBit)FitYitP
(1 Rit  NBit)Yit ⇥
P
(1 Rit  NBit)YitP
Yit
(7)
Studies that focus on regional spillovers typically apply the traditional nation-wide def-
inition to their regional spillover variable. This spillover variable is constructed as output
produced by foreign firms in industry j in region r as a share of total regional industry j
output, i.e. the first part of the first term in (7), rather than as a share of country-wide
industry j output.
The definition of an appropriate measure relates to one’s idea about spillover potential
(this is what the variables are intended to capture). Consider two regions A and B. In
region A 10 out of the total of 100 units are produced by foreign firms, while in region
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B 10,000 out of the total 100,000 units are produced by foreigners.
P
RitFitYit/
P
RitYit
is appropriate if one believes that the spillover potential is the same in both regions. In
the former case, spillovers should be thought of as limited to the region level since it is
diﬃcult to carry this definition through to the cross-region level. Suppose regions A and B
are neighbours. Following a logic of relative within territorial unit presence, the spillover
from neighbours could be measured as
P
NBitFitYit/
P
NBitYit . This results in a value of
0.10 for both region A and B. However, it seems counterintuitive that the spillover potential
from region A to B would equal the spillover potential from B to A. This is not the case
when using the second subcomponent of our decomposition in (6). In our example, this
results in a spillover potential from A to B of 10/100, 100 and a spillover potential from B
to A of 10, 000/100, 100. These values seem better aligned with the cross-region spillover
potential one would expect. Regions where a larger share of the foreign activity is located
carry a larger spillover potential and therefore should be reflected in the measure employed
in empirical work. Therefore, we apply the decomposition in (6) and allow for coeﬃcient
heterogeneity for the diﬀerent subcomponents.
3.2 Spillovers and time-since-foreign-entry
Abstracting for the moment from the geographical dimension in HRjt discussed in the
previous subsection, (1) hides another important dimension that deserves a closer inspection.
To see things more clearly, consider the following alternative breakdown of (1):
HRjt =
P eF 1itYitP
Yit
+
P eF 2itYitP
Yit
+ ...+
P eF nitYitP
Yit
(8)
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where eF x is a variable indicating foreign ownership status and entry timing. eF xit equals
the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors in firm i if at least 10% of shares were
owned by a single foreign investor in year t   x + 1 and firm i was not foreign owned in
year t   x, i.e. the investment took place between t   x + 1 and t   x. So eF xit is set to the
percentage of shares owned by foreign investors if
 
x 1X
v=0
Fi,t v = x
!
^
 1X
w=x
Fi,t w = 0
!
(9)
HRjt is thus broken down into HR1jt, HR2jt, and so on, along the lines of foreign entry
timing (note the diﬀerence with pure calendar time or taking lags of HRjt). A time-since-
foreign-entry definition for BKxjt follows from (2) and (8) above:
BKxjt =
X
k 6=j
 jkt ⇤HRxkt (10)
Various transmission channels discussed above imply an impact of foreign entry timing.
The mobility of workers trained by foreign firms, nor technology imitation are likely to
materialize in the very short run. Likewise, vertical spillovers driven by access to better
inputs produced by foreign firms or by supplying inputs to multinational companies might
not necessarily be instantaneous nor permanent. For the Irish electronics sector Görg and
Ruane (2001) find that foreign firms start oﬀ with a relatively low extent of local linkages,
but as they get accustomed, they proceed to develop more local input linkages. Based on
their Volvo case study Ivarsson and Alvstam (2005) conclude that technology transfer to
suppliers seems more eﬃcient in older MNE plants. Within multinationals technology is also
not necessarily easily or rapidly transferred (see Urata and Kawai (2000)). This may give
15
rise to specific time patterns in the transfer of technology to foreign aﬃliates and the ensuing
spillovers. Merlevede et al. (2014) introduce a time-since-foreign-entry pattern of spillover
eﬀects by allowing every term in (8) to have its own coeﬃcient ↵ eF (x).
We combine the regional and time-since-foreign-entry aspects into a single comprehensive
approach, as summarized in Table 1. We believe that combining both dimensions can provide
new insights due to interaction between both factors. It is not unlikely that the time-since-
entry pattern for within-region spillovers is diﬀerent from the time-since-entry pattern for
cross-region or rest-of-country spillovers, since it may take more time for domestic firms to
absorb spillovers from foreign firms in further-away regions. A failure to find cross-region
spillovers on the basis of aggregate variables as in (6) could be due to the fact that time-since-
foreign-entry has been neglected, rather than that these spillovers are truly non-existent.
Further note that some papers limit the scope of spillovers to the boundaries of a region by
the construction of their spillover variables (see Nicolini and Resmini (2010)). We model the
potential regional pattern explicitly and combine it in a novel way with time-since-foreign-
entry eﬀects.
[Insert Table 1 near here]
3.3 Empirical approach
Our empirical approach detailed in (4) above closely follows the existing literature de-
scribed earlier. We estimate domestic industry production functions using the ACF estimator
separately for each NACE4 2-digit manufacturing industry j in the period 1996-2005. Cap-
4NACE stands for Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes.
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ital, labor, and material inputs elasticities are thus treated as industry-specific. Firms that
are foreign at some point in time are excluded from the estimation.
The vector of spillover variables (FDIjt 1) covers diﬀerent horizontal and vertical spillover
variables described above. More specifically, HR, BK, and FW are decomposed in function
of both the geography and time-since-foreign-entry dimensions (for clarity industry and time
subscripts are dropped in (11)). We consider three diﬀerent regional dimensions: within-
region spillovers, HR_regt x, first-order neighbour spillovers, HR_nbt x, and spillovers
from the regions that make up the rest-of-country, HR_roct x. Considering the time span
of our dataset (1996-2005, cf. infra) we opt to include HR_xt to HR_xt 3 and create a
variable HR_xt 4+ which aggregates all foreign firms that have been present for at least
four full years on the domestic market, hence the summation from t to t  4+ in (11). Since
we do not have information on exact dates of foreign entry prior to 1996, the time span of
the dataset for the estimations reduces to 2001-2005 because of missing values.
 1f (FDIjt 1) =
4+X
x=0
 
↵t xreg HR_regt x + ↵t xnb HR_nb
t x + ↵t xroc HR_roct x
 
+
4+X
x=0
 
↵t xreg BK_regt x + ↵t xnb BK_nb
t x + ↵t xroc BK_roct x
 
+
4+X
x=
 
↵t xreg FW_regt x + ↵t xnb FW_nb
t x + ↵t xroc FW_roct x
 
(11)
Through the vector Zi(j)t we control for competition within the industry, measured by
the Herfindahl index, import competition in the industry, the share of intermediates supplied
in total industry output, and firm age. Further we use the region-industry share of national
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industry activity and the region’s share of national manufacturing activity to control for
region and region-industry agglomeration eﬀects. Specification (4) is first-diﬀerenced and
estimated by OLS. We also introduce industry (↵j), region (↵r), and time dummies (↵t)
in the first-diﬀerenced specification to account for unobserved factors that could be driving
growth performance at the region or industry level. This results in (12) as final specification
to be estimated. Since FDIjt and some control variables are defined at the industry level, and
estimations are performed at the firm level, standard errors need to be adjusted (Moulton
(1990)). Standard errors are therefore clustered for all observations in the same region,
industry and year (see Smarzynska Javorcik (2004)).
 tfpijrt =  
0
1 f (FDIjt 1) + 
0
2 Zi(j)t + ↵t + ↵j + ↵r + ✏ijrt (12)
4 Data
We use firm-level data for a panel of Romanian manufacturing firms during 1996-2005.
Since most foreign investment entered the country after 1996, Romania makes a very good
candidate to study the dynamic impact of recent foreign investment on domestic firm produc-
tivity (see Hilber and Voicu (2010)). Moreover, in a bid to bring all regions to a similar level
of economic development , the country has undergone a massive forced industrialisation for
about two decades prior to 1990s (see Ronnås (1984)). This was at least partially successful
due to the wide dispersion of natural resources across the country. Although the process
did not level out all regional diﬀerences that developed over centuries, it did reduce some
disparities and created a more standardised structure of counties with strong manufacturing
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bases and improved urban networks. The fall of communism in 1989 was accompanied by a
reversal of at least some of these policies, with severe restructuring in the industrial setup
of the country as a consequence. As a result, regional inequalities have risen due to both
market forces and a decrease in state intervention (see Antonescu (2012)). While we do not
have data for the 1990-1995 period, our sample still covers the early stages of the transition
period and therefore a relatively homogeneous regional setup.
Our firm-level data are taken from Amadeus, a Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publish-
ing database. Amadeus is a pan-European database of financial information on public and
private companies. Every month Bureau Van Dijk issues a new DVD with updated infor-
mation. A single issue of the DVD contains only the latest information on ownership and
firms that go out of business are dropped from the database fairly rapidly. Furthermore,
because Bureau Van Dijk updates individual ownership links between legal entities rather
than the full ownership structure of a given firm, the ownership information on a specific
DVD-issue often consists of a number of ownership links with diﬀerent dates, referring to the
last verification of a specific link. To construct our dataset with entry, exit, and time-specific
foreign entry in local Romanian firms, we therefore employed a series of diﬀerent issues of the
database. However, since ownership information is gathered at irregular intervals, we do not
have ownership information for all firm-owner-year combinations. 5 Given these specificities
of Amadeus, we first created a dataset at the firm-owner-year-level with the available infor-
mation from Amadeus. We then filled out missing firm-owner-year-entries under restriction
that the full ownership structure cannot exceed 100%. In case of time gaps between entries
5Identifying the same owner in diﬀerent issues is not always straightforward since an ID is only listed in case
the owner is a firm that is listed in Amadeus itself. For all other owners matching is done on the basis of
the name. Diﬀerences in spacings, plurals, addition to the name of a company-type, the use of characters
specific to Romanian versus standard Roman characters in diﬀerent issues are corrected for.
19
for the same owner-firm combination but with a diﬀerent share-size we assume that changes
show up immediately in the database. We then fill out the gaps with the older information.6
We focus on a sample of firms that report unconsolidated data.
Data are deflated using industry price level data at NACE rev.1.1 2-digit level. These
are taken from the Industrial Database for Eastern Europe from the Vienna Institute for
International Economic Studies (2008) and from the Romanian National Statistical Oﬃce
(RNSO) (2005). Real output Y is measured as operating revenues deflated by producer price
indices of the appropriate NACE industry; real material inputsM , are deflated by a weighted
intermediate input deflator where the industry-specific weighting scheme is drawn from the
IO tables. Labor L is expressed as the number of employees. Real capital K is measured
as tangible fixed assets, deflated by the average of the deflators for the following five NACE
industries: machinery and equipment (29); oﬃce machinery and computing (30); electrical
machinery and apparatus (31); motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers (34); and other
transport equipment (35) (see Smarzynska Javorcik (2004)). Detailed IO tables containing
105 (59 manufacturing) sectors for the period 1996–2005 were obtained from the RNSO.
We restrict the dataset to firms with on average at least 5 employees over the sample pe-
riod. The dataset is further trimmed for outliers by removing the top and bottom percentiles
of the annual growth rates of real operating revenues, real capital, labour, and real material
inputs.7 The share of foreign firms in the total number of sample firms steadily increased
6e.g.
Amadeus immediate
2000 40 40
2001 . 40
2002 50 50
7If the ‘outlier’ is the first or last observation for a specific firm and other data points appear ’normal’, the
other firm-year data are kept. If not all observations for this firm are dropped from the dataset.
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from 17% to 24% (10% to 15% if small firms are not excluded). Table 2 lists summary
statistics for both domestic and foreign firms. The stylized facts commonly found in the
literature are confirmed in our dataset. Foreign firms are larger in terms of employment and
capital, produce more output and are more productive. The productivity bonus of foreign
over domestic firms is 26% in case of the ACF methodology.
[Insert Table 2 near here]
Based on 15164 industry-region-year observations Table 3 reveals that on average over
industries, regions, and years about 25% of output is produced by foreign firms. The vast
majority of foreign output is on average produced in the rest-of-country, with within-region
and neighbouring-region aggregates accounting for 1 and 3.2 percentage-points only. The
interquartile range suggests limited variation for within-region and neighbouring-region ag-
gregates. Some industries are, however, fairly concentrated as testified by the maximum
value of 80%. Backward spillover variables show a more mitigated pattern as they are
a weighted average of downstream horizontal variables. The correlation between region-
neighbour, region-rest-of-country, and neighbour-rest-of-country are virtually zero at 0.03,
-0.05, and -0.07. Table 4 shows that for each regional aggregate foreign firms which have been
present for at least four years account for the largest share of output produced by foreign
firms in the industry and region. One should bear these numbers in mind when interpreting
the results below.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
[Insert Table 4 near here]
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5 Results
This section presents results of diﬀerent sets of estimations. For the sake of clarity and
in order to keep the tables manageable we do not report the results on the control variables
here. If not mentioned otherwise, we include age, industry competition, competition from
imports in the industry, the share of intermediates supplied in total industry output, and
time, industry and region dummies as control variables. We consider horizontal, backward
and forward spillovers. In line with the literature the latter turn out to be insignificant
(see Havránek and Irsˆová (2011)). We think of them as additional control variables and for
reasons of clarity and space we only report forward spillover results in the first results table
and omit them from further tables. We first discuss results that only focus on the distance
decomposition of the spillover variables. Then we combine the distance and time-since-
foreign-entry decompositions of the spillover variables and present our main results. We
refer the reader to Merlevede et al. (2014) for results on the time-since-entry decomposition
by itself.
5.1 Distance decomposition
Table 5 presents results for the distance decomposition. The table contains both the es-
timated coeﬃcients for spillover eﬀects over diﬀerent distances and an F-test for the equality
of the estimated coeﬃcients over distance. We observe that all horizontal spillover coeﬃ-
cients are significant. The estimated coeﬃcients increase with distance which suggests that
while positive spillover channels dominate, negative eﬀects such as increased competition are
somewhat stronger for nearby foreign firms. We cannot reject the diﬀerent coeﬃcients to be
22
equal, however. Therefore, distance between the foreign and domestic firms seems unimpor-
tant for horizontal spillover eﬀects and domestic firms benefit both from nearby and far away
foreign firms in the same industry. Backward spillover eﬀects are only statistically significant
from firms located further away, specifically in the rest-of-country area. This result could
reflect that backward spillover eﬀects originate from firms concentrated in a small number
of regions and from there spread to other regions of the country. For the average Romanian
region these regions would pertain to the rest-of-country category. Nonetheless, the test for
equality of coeﬃcients again is unable to reject the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients are equal.
The third column shows that forward spillovers are insignificant, a finding in line with the
literature.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
5.2 Distance and time-since-foreign-entry decomposition
Results in Table 5 do not account for the time-since-foreign-entry dimension which has
been found to be an important factor in shaping FDI spillover eﬀects. Table 6 therefore
shows our central result that combines the regional dimension with the time-since-foreign-
entry dimension. From specification (1) we infer that horizontal spillover eﬀects (column
a) are negative in the first years after entry, but turn positive when foreign firms ’mature’.
The intensity of horizontal spillovers again does not seem to vary in terms of FDI location
(nearby or far away), with very similar spillover coeﬃcients for same region, neighbouring
region, and rest-of-country aggregates. This is confirmed by the results in column 1 of
Table 7, as we cannot reject the equality of the horizontal spillover coeﬃcients across the
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regional dimension. This suggests that, independent of distance, the eﬀect of foreign presence
has similar impact on domestic firm productivity. Therefore, for a similar share of foreign
sales at each level, domestic firms experience similar productivity eﬀects whether foreign
firms are located in their own region, in a neighbouring region or in the rest-of-country. All
in all, it seems that the channels for horizontal spillovers are not localised, but
operate nation-wide.
[Insert Table 6 near here]
The time-since-entry dimension suggest that domestic firms experience an initial negative
impact following foreign firms’ entry, which could be due to considerable negative competi-
tion eﬀects or labour cherry picking. However, once foreign firms have been present for a
suﬃciently long period in the domestic economy (entry in t-4 or earlier), positive spillover
eﬀects do arise and they are suﬃciently large to compensate for earlier negative eﬀects. In
line with Table 5, point estimates again hint at a larger (or less negative) impact for foreign
firms located in the rest-of-country versus the own region, confirming that distance might
oﬀer some protection against negative eﬀects.
Backward spillover eﬀects in specification (1) column (b), on the other hand, show a larger
sensitivity to the distance between domestic and foreign firms. Both distance and time-since-
foreign-entry are important determinants of the magnitude of the backward spillover eﬀect
accruing to domestic firms. Taking time-since-foreign-entry into account, we find that entry
of foreign firms in the same region entails an immediate positive contribution to the domestic
firms’ productivity. In addition, positive spillover eﬀects from further away foreign firms need
more time to manifest themselves. To better illustrate the impact of backwards spillovers, in
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Figure 2 we plot the total expected contribution to a domestic firm’s TFP level of a foreign
entrant producing 2 per cent of downstream output annually, i.e. the backward spillover
eﬀect. From panel A of Figure 2 we clearly infer that a domestic firm would prefer to see
the foreign firm enter in its own region, as the expected backward spillover eﬀect over the
foreign firm’s life time is at least twice as large there compared to those from the other
two regional dimensions. The F-tests in Table 7 confirm a statistically significant bonus of
being close to foreign clients. Moreover, specifications (2) and (3) in Table 6 show that the
’being close’ bonus is not driven by a specific correlation structure between the diﬀerent
elements of the regional decomposition, since the exclusion of the neighbour variables or
the neighbour and rest   of   country variables does not aﬀect the results of the region
variable. Panel B of Figure 2 shows that positive and significant backward spillover eﬀects
are arising from foreign firms with limited maturity (this is in line with Merlevede et al.
(2014)). Allowing for the time-since-foreign-entry pattern shows a very strong initial impact
of supplying intermediate inputs to foreign firms located in the host region which decays over
time and disappears for more mature firms. The patterns for backward spillover eﬀects from
foreign firms in neighbouring regions or in rest-of-country regions are very similar and not
statistically diﬀerent from one another (cf. F-tests in Table 7). These spillover eﬀects take
more time to manifest themselves and also disappear once a foreign firm has been present for
a longer period in the host country. This explains the diﬀerence with our findings in Table 5
where we did not account for the time-since-foreign-entry pattern. Since only recent foreign
entrants drive regional diﬀerences in backward spillover eﬀects, lumping all firms together in
terms of time-since-foreign-entry prevents us from seeing this eﬀect.
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[Insert Figure 2 near here]
[Insert Table 7 near here]
Since Figure 2 does not convey much about the actual in-sample contribution to produc-
tivity for Romanian firms, we oﬀer two additional views of our results. First, we calculate
the period-average contribution to the TFP-level of the average domestic firm of the diﬀer-
ent spillover variables, as shown in Figure 3. This is achieved by multiplying the average
amount of foreign presence at all three regional levels with their respective coeﬃcients. More-
over, it gives a better indication of what foreign entry has brought for Romanian firms over
2001-2005. Figure 3 suggests that the average contribution of the rest-of-country horizontal
spillover is larger than those from either the own or neighbouring regions. This is due to
the combination of similar sized coeﬃcients as well as the fact that on average the amount
of foreign activity in the rest-of-country regional aggregate is much larger than in either the
own or neighbouring regions. From panel A of Figure 3 it is also clear that the positive
contribution after four years of foreign presence outweighs the negative eﬀects foreign firms
generate in the first three years. This confirms the fact that after an initial adjustment
period, domestic firms do benefit from the presence of foreign firms in their own industry
(cf. Merlevede et al. (2014)). Backward spillover eﬀects are limited to the first years after
foreign entry. For the average domestic firm the rest-of-country backward spillover eﬀect
is the largest because most of the foreign firms are located there, but the within-region
contribution is non-negligible.
[Insert Figure 3 near here]
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Second, since the previous result does not take into account regional heterogeneity in
Romania, we recalculate the expected impact in terms of spillover eﬀects on TFP from
moving a domestic firm between regions. We firs ’relocate’ a firm from Vaslui, a subpar
performing region in the North-East at the border with Moldova, to Timiş, a regional hub in
the South-West of Romania. This move increases the total spillover eﬀect on the log of the
TFP-level of the firm with 0.036. The eﬀect is for about two thirds driven by an increase
in the horizontal spillover eﬀect which in turn is driven mainly by an increase in the within-
region eﬀect (the negative neighbour and positive rest-of-country components are smaller and
cancel out). A further move from Timiş to Bucharest-Ilfov increases the total spillover eﬀect
by 0.058. In contrast to the previous move, the increase is now due to the combination of a
decrease in the horizontal eﬀect (-0.032) that is more than compensated by a larger increase
in the backward spillover eﬀect (0.091). The latter is due to the fact that being in the
same region as foreign entrants carries a statistically significant bonus in terms of backward
spillover eﬀects, as well as that Bucharest-Ilfov is the main TFP-hub in Romania, dwarfing
the other regions in terms of foreign presence and foreign entry over the sample period.
This also explains a within-region negative horizontal eﬀect in Bucharest-Ilfov, compared to
Timiş. In the latter the horizontal eﬀects from the many foreign firms located in Bucharest-
Ilfov have a more benign eﬀect as they are part of the rest-of-country component for firms
located there. The regions recording the smallest total spillover eﬀects over the sample period
are neighbours of Bucharest-Ilfov. This occurs due to the fact that they are less protected
from negative horizontal eﬀects from foreign firms in Bucharest-Ilfov as well as that they are
not close enough in order to benefit from the immediate positive backward spillover eﬀects
generated by the large number of foreign entrants in Bucharest-Ilfov. Note that all this is
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derived on the basis of point estimates and should be considered as indicating the direction
of the eﬀects. F-tests revealed that only the ’immediate’ within-region backward spillover
eﬀect (the largest source of spillover eﬀects) is found to be statistically diﬀerent from the
other geographical components.
In Table 8 we further explore regional heterogeneity in the estimation by testing whether
the identified patterns are stable across regions that perform above and below median region-
productivity. We use the approach of Foster et al. (2001) to calculate initial regional TFP
from our firm-level data.8 Regions with above median region-TFP levels could be interpreted
as more dynamic regions with larger absorptive capability, yielding a rationale to expect dif-
ferent patterns. As Table 8 indicates, more productive regions show slightly higher horizontal
spillover coeﬃcients compared to the entire sample. This might suggest that firms located
in these regions are on average better at adapting to foreign presence in their industry. Co-
eﬃcients are similar at all regional dimensions, indicating that location is not relevant for
horizontal spillover absorption. With respect to backward spillover eﬀects, we confirm the
’being-close bonus’, i.e. the significantly larger within-region backward spillover eﬀect from
recent foreign entrants. Overall, these patterns are fairly similar to those obtained using
the full sample. Diﬀerences emerge when we consider spillover patterns in below median
region-productivity regions. Within-region positive horizontal spillover eﬀects from foreign
firms with suﬃcient maturity are no longer detected (whereas they still are positive and
significant at the neighbour and rest-of-country levels). Similarly, for backward spillover
eﬀects, the within-region ’being-close bonus’ for new foreign entrants disappears, as do the
8We compute this value by a weighted sum of their individual productivities: Pr =
P
sir ⇤ pi and where sir
is the regional output share of firm i in region r and pi is its productivity.
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positive within-region backward spillover eﬀects from foreign firms entering two and three
years earlier. It also takes more time for other positive backward spillover eﬀects to manifest
themselves in these regions (3-4 years).
[Insert Table 8 near here]
[Insert Table 9 near here]
5.3 Foreign firms location choice
In table 8 we found that regions above and below the median region-productivity show
diﬀerent spillover patterns. One could argue that foreign firms would tend to locate in the
regions where they expect domestic firms with higher productivity (growth) to be located.
In order to make sure that our results are not driven by such factors, we analyze foreign
firms’ location choice within Romania. From panel A in Figure 4 one can observe that
the majority of foreign companies locates either near the Western border with Hungary
or in Bucharest-Ilfov, the capital region. This indicates that location choice is potentially
non-random.
Location choice can be explained by several factors. First of all, it has been suggested
that foreign companies investing in developing countries such as Romania face very specific
obstacles like widespread bureaucracies, corruption, insuﬃciently developed financial mar-
kets and unpredictable legal systems (see Bitzenis (2006)). Therefore, instead of focusing
solely on labour costs, foreign firms would locate in areas with high services agglomeration
or, in other words, large cities which allow them to have access to lawyers, accountants,
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translators and the banking industry (Hilber and Voicu (2010)). Second, location of foreign
subsidiaries might also be explained by the proximity to Western borders. Since a large
share of foreign investment has European roots, choosing a location closer to home might
constitute an advantage for their parents. Moreover, since Western border regions have for
a large part of recent history been under the influence of the Habsburg empire, locating in
this area might be more appealing from a cultural sense as well (see Becker et al. (2011)).
Nonetheless, there might still be an issue if the most productive (domestic) companies are
also located in these regions. Comparing panels A and B of Figure 4 suggests no immediate
problem. Nevertheless, we run two simple regressions to investigate how regional productivity
growth is related to the location choice of new foreign firms. We perform the analysis at
both the region and the region-industry level. We include a Western border dummy because
we expect the border to have a significant impact on location choice due to the closeness
to Western markets. Further we include a dummy that is set to one if the main national
road connecting Bucharest with Hungary passes through the region.9 Finally, we include the
regional rural rate obtained from the Romanian National Statistical Oﬃce (RNSO) (2014).
The results in Table 10 indicate that location is indeed heavily influenced by our control
variables but is not related to the lagged first diﬀerence of regional productivity of domestic
firms. We therefore conclude that foreign firm location is not influenced by the presence of
fast growing domestic firms in the region.
[Insert Figure 4 near here]
[Insert Table 10 near here]
9Other roads were underdeveloped and of poor quality during our sample period.
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6 Conclusion
This study analyzes horizontal and vertical productivity spillover eﬀects of foreign direct
investment on domestic Romanian manufacturing companies from 1996 to 2005. We add
to the literature by investigating the combined impact of physical distance and time-since-
foreign-entry on spillover eﬀects. Since spillover variables are typically based on foreign
firms’ share in total industry output, they are often lumped together, new and old, in one
variable. Moreover, the literature usually measure spillovers at country level, disregarding
the potential eﬀect of distance between foreign and domestic firms. We allow spillover eﬀects
to vary both over time-since-foreign-entry and the relative location of foreign and domestic
firms according to their NUTS-3 digit geographic location.
Horizontal spillovers are rather homogeneous across distance. Recent foreign entrants
have a negative impact on local competitors’ TFP which are more than compensated by
positive eﬀects once foreign firms have been present for a longer period in the domestic
economy. This indicates that it takes time for domestic firms to adjust to foreign presence
in the short-run, with productivity improvements being realised provided these companies
withstand the initial pressures from foreign entrants and are able to absorb the new foreign
technology. This finding does not diﬀer between above and below median productivity
regions and is also robust to the removal of the most FDI intensive region of Romania.
In terms of backward spillovers, our results indicate that these manifest themselves rela-
tively fast after foreign entry, but fade away when foreign firms have been present for a longer
period. Further, we find that being located in the same region as foreign firms carries an
immediate productivity bonus compared to foreign firms located further away. This eﬀect is
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stronger for domestic firms located in regions with above median productivity levels. When
located in below median productivity regions, positive backward spillover eﬀects are not
immediate and mainly originate from further away regions. This suggests that over larger
distances spillovers are absorbed, but at a slower pace.
All in all, our findings suggest that overall spillover eﬀects from foreign direct investment
are likely to be positive, but both horizontal and backward spillover eﬀects vary considerably
with foreign firms’ maturity. Backward spillover eﬀects are faster and larger when the dis-
tance between domestic firms and their foreign clients is smaller. Horizontal spillover eﬀects
vary with distance on the basis of point estimates (the closer, the smaller the spillover eﬀect),
but these diﬀerences are not statistically significant.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Industry output produced by foreign firms in a NUTS 3 region as a share of total
country-wide output of the industry (the average over manufacturing industries
in a given region is plotted)
(a) 2000
(3,100]
(2,3]
(1,2]
(.5,1]
(.25,.5]
[0,.25]
(b) 2005
(3,100]
(2,3]
(1,2]
(.5,1]
(.25,.5]
[0,.25]
Figure 2: Backward spillover eﬀect of a foreign firm producing 2 per cent of downstream
output
(a) Distance impact
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Region Neighbour Rest of Country
Significant Insignificant
(b) Distance and time-since-foreign-entry
impact
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
Sp
illo
ve
r I
nt
en
sit
y
t t−1 t−2 t−3 t−4
Region Neighbour
Rest of Country Insignificant
The figure shows the actual contribution to a domestic firm’s TFP level of a foreign firm each year producing
2 per cent of downstream output.
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Figure 3: Average eﬀect
(a) Horizontal Spillovers
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(b) Backward Spillovers
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The figure shows the actual contribution of the FDI on the productivity of domestic firms, where each
coeﬃcient is augmented by the amount of foreign presence at the respective regional dimension.
Figure 4: Share of foreign firms and regional productivity
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percentage of total country number of
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Table 1: Coeﬃcient heterogeneity in a regional time-since-foreign-entry approach
Region/Time-since-foreign-entry t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4+
same region CR,t CR,t 1 CR,t 2 CR,t 3 CR,t 4+
neighbour region CNB,t CNB,t 1 CNB,t 2 CNB,t 3 CNB1,t 4+
rest of country CRoC,t CRoC,t 1 CRoC,t 2 CRoC,t 3 CRoC,t 4+
Table 2: TFP summary statistics
All firms Domestic firms Foreign firms
n=133154 n=105854 n=27300
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
ln(real output) 13.74 1.90 13.53 1.84 14.52 1.94
ln(employment) 3.08 1.47 2.93 1.40 3.67 1.57
ln(capital) 12.08 2.32 11.82 2.26 13.06 2.29
ln(tfp) ACF 5.74 1.52 5.69 1.52 5.95 1.47
Summary statistics for foreign and domestic firms.
Table 3: Summary statistics for the distance decomposition
Mean Median IQR P25 Min Max
horizontal
region 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 80.3
neighbour 3.2 0.6 3.1 0.0 0.0 83.5
rest-of-country 20.7 17.5 21.5 8.5 0.0 87.2
backward
region 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 38.7
neighbour 1.7 0.7 1.2 0.3 0.0 26.8
rest-of-country 14.4 14.5 9.8 9.3 0.1 62.9
Table entries refer to the share of total country-wide industry output produced by foreign firms in the region,
neighbouring region, and rest-of-country regional aggregates. Numbers are based on 15164 industry-region-
year observations.
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Table 4: Summary statistics for the distance and time-since-foreign-entry decomposition
t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4+
region 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.78
neighbour 0.13 0.37 0.45 0.47 2.59
rest-of-country 0.78 2.40 2.98 3.22 16.52
Table entries refer to the share of total country-wide industry output produced by foreign firms of a given
maturity (indicated in column headings) in the region, neighbouring region, and rest-of-country regional
aggregates. Numbers are averages over 15164 industry-region-year observations.
Table 5: Results when applying the distance decomposition to spillover variables
Horizontal Backward Forward
same region 0.834* 1.577 -1.924
[0.461] [1.058] [1.261]
neighbouring region 1.117*** 0.305 1.465
[0.287] [0.916] [0.914]
rest of country 1.438*** 1.354*** 0.082
[0.141] [0.375] [0.322]
Reg=NB=RoC 1.269 0.691 2.325*
Observations 49,074
R-squared 0.05
The table presents both the regression results for the geographical component alone and a test for the equality
of coeﬃcients at regional, neighbour and rest-of-country level with the corresponding F-test. Robust standard
errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. F-test * rejected at 10%;
** rejected at 5%; *** rejected at 1%.
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Table 6: Horizontal and Backward spillovers
(1) (2) (3)
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Horizontal Backward Horizontal Backward Horizontal Backward
entry in t
same region -0.573 18.229*** -0.427 19.850*** -0.163 20.148**
[0.953] [6.921] [0.964] [7.073] [1.030] [9.876]
neighbouring region 0.888 -0.347
[0.546] [5.191]
rest of country 0.183 2.712 0.421 2.405
[0.332] [1.740] [0.307] [1.682]
entry in t-1
same region -2.483*** 10.983*** -2.394*** 11.733*** -2.620*** 9.939***
[0.814] [2.929] [0.821] [2.937] [0.861] [3.329]
neighbouring region -1.575*** 5.202
[0.577] [3.750]
rest of country -1.089*** 8.464*** -1.104*** 8.175***
[0.374] [1.094] [0.354] [1.062]
entry in t-2
same region -1.426*** 3.342*** -1.393** 3.578*** -1.527** 2.568**
[0.539] [1.122] [0.541] [1.134] [0.618] [1.288]
neighbouring region -2.461*** 6.227**
[0.562] [2.820]
rest of country -1.427*** 4.223*** -1.549*** 4.325***
[0.269] [0.745] [0.263] [0.726]
entry in t-3
same region 0.263 3.844*** 0.238 3.969*** -0.026 2.758*
[0.437] [1.415] [0.439] [1.465] [0.490] [1.454]
neighbouring region 0.083 2.785
[0.525] [2.456]
rest of country 0.583*** 4.287*** 0.555*** 4.125***
[0.193] [0.971] [0.186] [0.939]
entry in t-4 or earlier
same region 1.546*** 0.525 1.539*** 0.543 1.212*** -0.191
[0.412] [1.214] [0.416] [1.215] [0.453] [1.350]
neighbouring region 1.814*** -1.368
[0.315] [1.025]
rest of country 2.109*** -0.439 2.053*** -0.594
[0.155] [0.435] [0.152] [0.418]
Observations (49,074) 49,074 49,074
R-squared (0.071) 0.070 0.045
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 7: Test for equality of coeﬃcients
F-test Horizontal Backward
Regt=NBt=RoCt 1.114 2.535*
Regt=NBt 1.833 4.280**
NBt=RoCt 1.238 0.331
Regt=RoCt 0.558 4.811**
Regt 1=NBt 1=RoCt 1 1.313 0.776
Regt 2=NBt 2=RoCt 2 1.656 0.514
Regt 3=NBt 3=RoCt 3 0.606 0.197
Regt 4+=NBt 4+=RoCt 4+ 1.249 0.833
The table presents a test for the equality of coeﬃcients at regional, neighbour and rest-of-country level with
the corresponding F-test value. * rejected at 10%; ** rejected at 5%; *** rejected at 1%.
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Table 8: Horizontal and Backward spillovers in Above and Below median productivity
regions
(1) Above (2) Below
(a) Horizontal (b) Backwards (a) Horizontal (b) Backwards
entry in t
same region -0.504 17.618** 0.86 49.695
[1.130] [7.697] [0.993] [47.094]
neighbouring region -0.941 -3.248 1.800*** 17.84
[0.848] [5.904] [0.520] [11.637]
rest of country 0.571 2.258 -0.584 4.253
[0.404] [2.204] [0.596] [2.707]
entry in t-1
same region -2.266** 11.669*** -4.242 46.056*
[0.899] [3.215] [5.865] [26.022]
neighbouring region -1.662** 3.813 -3.358*** 8.43
[0.705] [4.240] [1.090] [8.258]
rest of country -0.852* 8.711*** -1.247*** 8.071***
[0.498] [1.319] [0.446] [1.882]
entry in t-2
same region -1.316** 3.577*** -10.850** 13.994
[0.582] [1.190] [4.722] [15.817]
neighbouring region -2.506*** 2.039 -3.255*** 19.132***
[0.705] [3.140] [0.889] [5.051]
rest of country -1.475*** 3.761*** -1.157*** 4.962***
[0.342] [0.961] [0.389] [1.039]
entry in t-3
same region 0.409 3.808*** -4.784 21.948
[0.450] [1.384] [3.554] [24.714]
neighbouring region 0.16 1.022 0.089 8.411*
[0.643] [2.814] [0.845] [4.593]
rest of country 0.767*** 3.680*** 0.404 5.775***
[0.253] [1.283] [0.277] [1.240]
entry in t-4 or earlier
same region 1.713*** 0.264 1.652 10.432
[0.413] [1.246] [1.473] [9.899]
neighbouring region 2.136*** -1.01 1.584*** -2.834
[0.398] [1.208] [0.482] [2.176]
rest of country 2.301*** -0.383 1.998*** -0.4
[0.204] [0.571] [0.234] [0.656]
Observations 33,693 15,381
R-squared 0.075 0.072
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 9: Test for equality of coeﬃcients - Above/Below
F-test (1) Above (2) Below(a) Horizontal (b) Backward (a) Horizontal (b) Backward
Regt=NBt=RoCt 1.514 2.303 4.860*** 1.094
Regt=NBt 0.103 4.402** 0.885 0.439
NBt=RoCt 2.702 0.816 9.643*** 1.344
Regt=RoCt 0.797 3.742* 1.662 0.931
Regt 1=NBt 1=RoCt 1 1.175 1.159 1.88 1.062
Regt 2=NBt 2=RoCt 2 1.163 0.145 4.347** 4.168**
Regt 2=NBt 2 1.913 0.208 2.498 0.092
NBt 2=RoCt 2 2.061 0.288 5.035** 7.754***
Regt 2=RoCt 2 0.068 0.015 4.138** 0.325
Regt 3=NBt 3=RoCt 3 0.623 0.45 1.114 0.341
Regt 4+=NBt 4+=RoCt 4+ 1.006 0.318 0.381 1.218
The table presents a test for the equality of coeﬃcients at regional, neighbour and rest-of-country level with
the corresponding F-test value. * rejected at 10%; ** rejected at 5%; *** rejected at 1%.
Table 10: Location of foreign firms
New foreign firms New foreign firms
(region) (region industry)
Regional productivity growth 0.021 -0.006
[0.576] [0.006]
DN1 road 11.146*** 0.220***
[2.550] [0.048]
HU border 10.564*** 0.313***
[2.424] [0.057]
Rural rate -52.326*** -1.740***
[11.965] [0.194]
Observations 369 6,293
R-squared 0.356 0.061
The table shows the regression results of local firm productivity change on foreign firm location. Standard
errors are reported in brackets. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant
at 1 percent. The dependent variables are the lag of the first diﬀerence in regional/region-industry firm
productivity of domestic firms, a dummy indicating whether the main national road is crossing the region,
a dummy for bordering regions with Hungary and the regional rural rate.
46
